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Abstract
In certiﬁed email (CEM) protocols, TTP transparency is an important security requirement which helps
to avoid bad publicity as well as protecting individual users’ privacy. Recently we have extended the
CEM protocol of Cederquist et al. to satisfy TTP transparency. As a continuation, in this paper, we
formally verify the security requirement in the exteded protocol. The properties of fairness, eﬀectiveness
and timeliness are checked in the model checker Mocha, and TTP transparency is analysed in the toolsets
μCRL and CADP. The results conﬁrm that our proposed extension achieves our design goals.
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1 Introduction
Certiﬁed email (CEM) protocols, as an extension of regular email services, require
that both senders and receivers be responsible for their roles in the email services.
That means, as a protocol successfully runs to the end, neither the sender can deny
the dispatch of the email, nor can the receiver deny the receipt. Such requirements
are usually implemented by a non-repudiable evidence of origin (EOO) that is to be
acquired by the receiver, and a non-repudiable evidence of receipt (EOR) that is to
be acquired by the sender. Both the EOO and the EOR may serve as evidences in
case of a dispute.
As a special class of fair exchange protocols [20], a CEM protocol is supposed
to guarantee fairness with respect to non-repudiable evidences. Informally, at the
end of a fair protocol run, either both parties acquire all the evidences, or no party
gets an evidence. A trusted third party (TTP) can be introduced to take charge
of the whole procedure and to provide undeniable records of submission (of the
sender) and delivery (of the receiver). However in this way, a TTP may easily
become a bottleneck, if she has to be involved in a large number of CEM services.
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A better solution, so called optimistic protocols [5], helps to release this burden
from a TTP. In the optimistic protocols, a TTP is only required to be involved in
case of unexpected events, such as a network failure or one party’s misbehaviour,
to restore fairness. If both the signer and the receiver behave correctly and there is
no presence of signiﬁcant network delays, a CEM protocol terminates successfully
without intervention of the TTP. TTP transparency states that if a TTP has been
contacted to help in a protocol, the resulting evidences will be the same as those
obtained in the case where the TTP has not participated. In other words, by
simply looking at the evidences, it is impossible to detect whether the TTP has
been involved or not. Transparent TTPs are important and useful in practice, for
instance, to avoid bad publicity. Moreover, this property also ensures privacy of the
participants for asking for help from TTPs. In the context of CEM protocols, the
use of a transparent TTP was ﬁrst proposed by Micali [17], followed by a number
of works, e.g., [16,18,19,21,12], in which diﬀerent cryptographic schemes are used to
achieve TTP transparency.
Recently, we have developed a CEM protocol with a transparent TTP [15],
based on the protocol of Cederquist et al. [9] that applies key chains to reduce
TTP’s storage requirement. We achieve TTP transparency by adopting the veriﬁ-
ably encrypted signature scheme of [22]. We have shown that our extension is one
of the most eﬃcient CEM protocols satisfying TTP transparency, in addition to the
other important properties such as strong fairness, eﬀectiveness, and timeliness.
The justiﬁcations to our claims are carried out on a rather informal level [15]. In
this paper, we intend to put our analysis one step further, by incorporating formal
veriﬁcation techniques. The ﬁnite-state model checker Mocha [4] is used to verify
the properties of fairness, timeliness and eﬀectiveness, that are naturally interpreted
in alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) formulas with game semantics [3]. The
veriﬁcation of properties expressed in ATL corresponds to the computation of win-
ning strategies. Another toolset μCRL [7,6] is used for TTP transparency, which
requires a comparison of observable traces in various situations. The μCRL toolset
has the ability of generating state spaces that can be visualized and manipulated
by the toolbox CADP [11] which acts as a back-end of μCRL.
Structure of the paper. We explain our proposed extension of the CEM protocol [9]
and discuss its desired properties in Sect. 2. The two veriﬁcation tools, Mocha and
μCRL, are presented brieﬂy in Sect. 3. In Sect. 4 we verify fairness, timeliness and
eﬀectiveness in Mocha with a focus on the modelling, and in Sect. 5 we verify TTP
transparency in μCRL. Related work is discussed in Sect. 6. We conclude the paper
in Sect. 7.
2 A Key Chain Based TTP Transparent CEM Protocol
Our protocol is developed on basis of the protocol [9], to support TTP transparency.
Key chains are used to reduce TTP’s storage requirement. Once a key chain is ini-
tialized between Alice and Bob, Alice can use any key within it to encrypt messages.
Our approach requires the usage of a veriﬁably encrypted signature scheme to en-
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code a receiver’s commitment to receive the email.
For the sake of readability, we write Alice for the sender and Bob for the re-
ceiver. We assume the communication channels are resilient, in the sense that every
message is guaranteed to reach its destination eventually. We write {M}k to denote
a message m encrypted with a symmetric key k, and (M)P to denote party P ’s sig-
nature on message M . 1 We write (M)B|T for Bob’s veriﬁably encrypted (partial)
signature on M , by using the public key of TTP to encrypt Bob’s signature on M .
Everyone can verify that (M)B|T is authentic, but only TTP and Bob are able to
extract the complete signature (M)B out of (M)B|T .
2.1 The proposed protocol
The structure of our protocol consists of an exchange sub-protocol, an abort sub-
protocol and a recover sub-protocol. The exchange sub-protocol is executed by
the communicating parties to deliver an email as well as exchanging undeniable
evidences. The other sub-protocols are launched by a party to contact a TTP to
deal with awry situations. Each exchange that uses the protocol is called a protocol
round, and one initialisation phase followed by a number of protocol rounds is called
a protocol session. Each protocol session belongs to a unique pair of communication
parties.
Key chain generation. In optimistic CEM protocols, communicating parties will
request TTP for help if the exchange process is disrupted. To achieve (strong)
fairness, the TTP often needs to store suﬃcient amount of information, to have the
ability to decrypt, retrieve or send out information for the protocol to ﬁnally reach
a fair state. In most existing CEM protocols, the initiator uses either TTP’s public
key [18] or a separate key [21] to encrypt the email for each exchange. This ﬁrst
method normally requires asymmetric key operations, which are more expensive
than symmetric key operations. The second method gives TTP burden of storing
information of exchanges, such as involved parties, a hash value of email content
and so on.
To reduce the TTP’s burden of storing too much information, the protocol [9]
uses key chains. A chain of keys is a sequence of keys K ′0, . . . ,K ′n, such that K ′i :=
H(Gi(K0)) for each i ≥ 0, where K0 is the seed, H : κ → κ is a publicly known
one-way collision-resistant hash function and G : κ → κ is a publicly known acyclic
function (κ is a key domain). H and G are non-commutative, i.e., given an H(Ki)
for which Ki is unknown, it is infeasible to compute H(G(Ki)).
Initialisation. To initialise a session, the initiator Alice (A) sends the key chain seed
K0 and the identity of the potential responder Bob (B), together with a nonce nc to
the TTP (T ). TTP will check whether there already exists an entry 〈A,B,K0, sid′〉
in her database indicating whether the key chain has been established. If yes, TTP
just ignores this request. Otherwise, TTP will choose a new session identity sid,
and send the message cert := (A,B, sid)T to Alice, and then store 〈A,B,K0, sid〉
in her database.
1 In practice a signature is always applied on a hashed value.
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Exchange sub-protocol. The ith protocol round in a protocol session sid is described
below. The round number i is initially 0 and can arbitrarily grow, Alice incrementing
i after each round. For convenience, we use EOR
1
2
M to denote (EOOM )B|T .
1ex. A → B : A,B, T, i, sid, h(K ′i), {M}K′i ,EOOM , cert
2ex. B → A : EOR
1
2
M
3ex. A → B : K ′i
4ex. B → A : EORM
At ﬁrst, Alice sends out message 1ex to Bob. After receiving EOOM , Bob sends
out his partial signature on EOOM to show his commitment to receive the email. If
Alice further sends Bob the key K ′i, Bob will deliver a full signature back to Alice
as the ﬁnal evidence of receipt.
Abort sub-protocol. Only Alice can abort, provided that the protocol has not yet
been recovered. Typically, Alice aborts if she does not receive message 2ex. To
abort an exchange, Alice sends TTP the following message:
1a. A → T : fa, A,B, i, sid, h({M}K′i), abrt
where fa is a ﬂag used to identify the abort request and abrt is Alice’s signature
on the abort request. After receiving this request, TTP checks several things such
as the correctness of signatures, identities, entries for the key chain, and status(i)
to make decisions. If status(i) has not been initialised, TTP will set it as aborted
(status(i) := a) and send back an abort token. If the current round has been
recovered, TTP checks whether status(i) = h({M}K′i). If yes, TTP will send back
a recovery token. Otherwise, an error message of the form (error, (error, abrt)T ) is
sent back.
Recovery sub-protocol. Alice is allowed to launch the recovery sub-protocol provided
she has sent out message 3ex, but has not received message 4ex. Similarly, Bob can
launch the recovery sub-protocol if he has sent out message 2ex, but has not received
message 3ex. The ﬁrst message of the recovery sub-protocol for Alice is
1rA. A → T : fr, A,B, h(K ′i), h({M}K′i), i, sid,EOR
1
2
M ,EOOM
where fr is a ﬂag used to identify the recovery request. The ﬁrst message of the
recovery sub-protocol for Bob is
1rB. B → T : fr, A,B, h(K ′i), h({M}K′i), i, sid,EORM ,EOOM
On receipt of a message for recovery, TTP needs to check (1) the correctness of
(veriﬁably encrypted) signatures on EOOM and EORM (EOR
1
2
M ), (2) the identity of
TTP, and (3) whether there is an entry in its database matching 〈A,B, , sid〉. If all
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the above checks succeed, TTP will retrieveK0 and (4) check whether h(H(G
i(K0)))
matches h(K ′i). If yes, TTP will check status(i) for round i.
• If status(i) has not been initialised, TTP will set status(i) := h({M}K′i). When-
ever necessary TTP converts EOR
1
2
M into EORM . After that, TTP sends out the
following messages.
2r. T → B : K ′i, (K ′i)T
3r. T → A : EORM
• If status(i) = h({M}K′i), then TTP performs step 2r and step 3r (again).
• If status(i) = a, TTP sends out the abort token to the one that launched the
protocol.
2r. T → A(B) : abrt, (abrt)T
If any of the tests (1), (2), (3) and (4) fails, TTP ignores the recovery request and
sends back an error message.
2r. T → A(B) : error, (error,mr)T
where mr is the whole message received in step 1rA or 1
r
B.
Evidences and dispute resolution. When a disputation occurs, both parties are
required to provide evidences to an external judge. For each protocol round i, EOO
(evidence of origin) desired by Bob consists of
A,B, T,M, i, sid,K ′i,EOOM .
EOR (evidence of receipt) desired by Alice consists of
A,B, T,M, i, sid,K ′i, cert,EORM .
2.2 Security requirements
The following properties are claimed to be satisﬁed by the proposed protocol.
Eﬀectiveness. If no error occurs then the protocol successfully runs till the end
without any intervention from TTP.
Timeliness. Both Alice and Bob have the ability to eventually ﬁnish the protocol
anywhere during the protocol execution. This is to prevent endless waiting of an
honest party in case of unexpectancies.
Fairness. Honest Alice (Bob) will get her (his) evidences, provided that the other
party gets the evidence from her (him). 2 The evidences can be used to convince
an adjudicator that Bob has received the mail, in Alice’s case, or that Alice is
the true sender of the message, in Bob’s case. A protocol satisﬁes fairness if every
judgement on Bob’s (Alice’s) non-repudiation can be made solely and independently
2 Note that only honest participants need to be protected.
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from Alice’s (Bob’s) evidences, i.e., it does not necessarily involve TTP, nor the
participation of Bob (Alice).
TTP transparency. The evidence each participant obtains is of the same format
regardless of whether TTP is involved in the protocol execution or not.
3 A Brief Description of Mocha and μCRL
To formally analyse whether a security protocol achieves its design goals, ﬁrst we
have to specify the protocol in a formal language, and then express speciﬁcations
for the desired properties. The model checker Mocha [4] allows speciﬁcation of
models with concurrent game structures, and expression of properties using ATL
(Alternating-time Temporal Logic) [3] formulas with game semantics, which is suit-
able for checking properties such as fairness, eﬀectiveness and timeliness. As to
the analysis of TTP transparency, our main idea is to compare traces of getting
evidences from diﬀerent situations. 3 Therefore, a process algebraic language μCRL
and its toolset [7,6] are used.
3.1 Mocha and ATL
Mocha [4] is an interactive veriﬁcation environment for the modular and hierarchical
veriﬁcation of heterogeneous systems. Its model framework is in the form of reactive
modules. The states of a reactive module are determined by variables and are
changed in a sequence of rounds. Mocha can check ATL formulas, which express
properties naturally as winning strategies with game semantics. This is the main
reason we choose Mocha as our model checker. Mocha provides a guarded command
language to model the protocols, which uses the concurrent game structures as its
formal semantics. The syntax and semantics of this language can be found in [4].
The temporal logic ATL is deﬁned with respect to a ﬁnite set Π of propositions
and a ﬁnite set of players. An ATL formula is one of the following:
• p for propositions p ∈ Π.
• ¬φ or φ1 ∨ φ2, where φ, φ1, and φ2 are ATL formulas.
• 〈〈A〉〉 φ, 〈〈A〉〉φ, or 〈〈A〉〉φ1Uφ2, where A⊆ Σ is a set of players, and φ, φ1 and
φ2 are ATL formulas.
ATL formulas are interpreted over the states of a concurrent game structure that
has the same propositions and players [3]. The labeling of the states of a concurrent
game structure with propositions is used to evaluate the atomic formulas of ATL.
The logical connectives ¬ and ∨ have the standard meaning. Intuitively, the opera-
tor 〈〈A〉〉 acts as a selective quantiﬁcation over those paths that the agents in A can
enforce. The path quantiﬁers  (next),  (globally) and U (until) carry their usual
meanings as in the logic CTL, and φ is deﬁned as true Uφ.
3 This cannot be done with Mocha.
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3.2 μCRL and CADP
μCRL is a language for specifying distributed systems and protocols in an algebraic
style. A μCRL speciﬁcation consists of two parts: one part speciﬁes the data types,
the other part speciﬁes the processes.
The data part contains equational speciﬁcations; one can declare sorts and func-
tions working upon these sorts, and describe the meaning of these functions by
equations. Processes are represented by process terms. Process terms consist of
action names and recursion variables with zero or more data parameters, combined
with process-algebraic operators. Actions and recursion variables carry zero or more
data parameters. Intuitively, an action can execute itself, after which it terminates
successfully. There are two predeﬁned actions: δ represents deadlock, τ the internal
action. p.q denotes sequential composition, it ﬁrst executes p and then q. p+q
denotes non-deterministic choice, meaning that it can behave as p or q. Summation
∑
d:D p(d) provides the possibly inﬁnite choice over a data type D. The conditional
construct p  b  q, with b a boolean data term, behaves as p if b and as q if not b.
Parallel composition p‖q interleaves the actions of p and q; moreover, actions from
p and q may synchronise into a communication action, if explicitly allowed by a
predeﬁned communication function. Two actions can only synchronise if their data
parameters are the same, which means that communication can be used to capture
data transfer from one process to another. If two actions are able to synchronise,
then in general we only want these actions to occur in communication with each
other, and not on their own. This can be enforced by the encapsulation operator
∂H(p), which renames all occurrences in p of actions from the set H into δ. Addi-
tionally, the hiding operator τI(p) turns all occurrences in p of actions from the set
I into τ .
The μCRL tool set [7] is a collection of tools for analysing and manipulating
μCRL speciﬁcations. The μCRL tool set, together with the CADP tool set [11],
which acts as a back-end for the μCRL tool set, features visualisation, simulation,
LTS generation and minimisation, model checking, theorem proving and state-bit
hashing capabilities.
4 Veriﬁcation of the Protocol in Mocha
We give a sketch of our modeling approach and discuss the built models for the
extended CEM protocol. Detailed models and analysis can be found in [14].
4.1 Modeling the protocol in Mocha
At ﬁrst, each participant is modelled as a player (in a game), with the description of
its behaviours using the guarded command language of Mocha. Models for honest
participants can be easily speciﬁed strictly in accordance with the protocol. As to
the dishonest models, we mainly consider the dishonest participant’s behaviours,
since the security of CEM protocol can be hazarded by dishonest participants in-
stead of outside intruders. Therefore, we build models for both honest and dishonest
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participants. For each participant, we write Pi and PiH to represent the dishonest
and honest models, respectively. Intuitively, dishonest model Pi allows the player to
cheat, while PiH just follows the protocol honestly. Dishonest behaviours include
sending messages derivable from his knowledge at any time, stopping at any time;
therefore, a dishonest model may not stop at a point where its role in the protocol
is required to stop.
Communication is modelled using shared variables. Evidences (EOO and EOR),
key and emails are modelled as boolean variables which are initialised as false and
updated by its sender. We model the action of sending out an evidence, or other
messages as a guarded command in which the sender resets the corresponding vari-
ables as true. In the model for honest participant PiH, the guard consists of all
the conditions to be satisﬁed strictly according to the protocol, and the command
consists of all the corresponding actions to be executed. However, for the dishonest
Pi, the guard just consists of necessary messages to generate the message to be sent.
List. 1 gives the Mocha code describing the behaviours of honest Alice. At ﬁrst,
Alice can do idle actions after she initiates a protocol round by sending out EOOM .
For honest Alice, she mainly performs two kinds of actions in the exchange sub-
protocol, which includes sending evidence of origin and the key. They are described
in step (1) and (2). Step (1) models the action of sending EOOM , in which we use
boolean variables hk and pa eoo to represent the hashed value ofK ′i and the message
(B, T, i, sid, h(K ′i), {M}K′i)A signed by Alice, respectively. Setting hk and pa eoo to
true means Alice has initiated a communication with Bob by sending out her EOOM .
Step (2) says that if Alice has received the correct veriﬁably encrypted message,
namely pb halfeorm has become true, she can set k as true, which represents the
action of sending out key K ′i. Except for the exchange sub-protocol, Alice is also
able to initiate the abort protocol if she does not receive the veriﬁably encrypted
signature pb halfeorm from Bob. This abort request A abort req is described in
step (4), in which the guard represents the requirements for asking for abort from
TTP, and the commands represent the behaviour of contacting TTP for abort.
Besides the abort sub-protocol, Alice can also initiate the recovery sub-protocol
which is modelled in step (6). Recovery request is modelled as a boolean variable
A recovery req, and it will be set to be true if the guard is satisﬁed, in which
the k and pb halfeorm are true while pb eorm is false. Note that once honest
Alice initiates a recovery or abort sub-protocol with TTP, she will not continue the
exchange sub-protocol. This mechanism is realized by modeling a boolean variable
A contacted T . Finally, Alice can stop if she receives ﬁnal EORM from Bob (step
(3)) or recovery token from TTP (step (7)). Abort token (step (5)) can also make
Alice stop the protocol round. In a similar way, we can model the honest behaviours
of Bob.
Listing 1: Extracted honest model of Alice for the extended CEM protocol
-- idle actin while not stopped
[] ~pa_stop & pa_eoo ->
-- (1) Alice sends EOO to Bob
[] ~pa_stop & ~A_contacted_T & ~pa_eoo
-> pa_eoo ’:= true; hk ’:= true
-- (2) Alice sends out key while receiving half EOR_M
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[] ~pa_stop & ~A_contacted_T & pb_halferom & ~k
-> k’:= true
-- (3) Alice can stop when she receives Bob ’s EOR
[] ~pb_stop & ~A_contacted_T & pb_eorm & ~pa_rece_eorm
-> pa_rece_erom ’:= true
-- (4) Alice can send out abort request to TTP
if she hasn ’t received half EOR_M from Bob
[] ~pa_stop & ~A_contacted_T & pa_eoo & ~pb_halfeorm
-> A_contacted_T ’:= true; A_abort_req ’:= true
-- (5) Alice stops after receiving abort token from TTP
[] ~pa_stop & A_contacted_T & T_abort_send_A
-> T_abort_token_A ’:= true; pa_stop ’:= true
-- (6) Alice can send recovery request
while she possesses pb_halfeorm
[] ~pa_stop & ~A_contacted_T & k & pb_halfeorm & ~pb_eorm
-> A_contacted_T ’:= true; A_recovery_req ’:= true
-- (7) Alice stops after receiving recovery token from TTP
[] ~pa_stop & T_recovery_send_A ->
pa_rece_eorm ’ := true; pa_stop ’:= true
List. 2 describes the behaviours of dishonest Alice, her malicious behaviours are
described as follows. At ﬁrst Alice is allowed not only to idle, but also to stop and
to quit the protocol at any time she wants. The behaviours of sending EOOM and
the key are speciﬁed in step (1) and (2). Step (1) models that Alice can send out
her evidence of origin by setting variable pa eoo to true at any time she wants, even
if she has already contacted TTP and is supposed to stop. Together with pa eoo,
malicious Alice still has the choice of sending out correct hashed key hk or incorrect
hashed key hke. Similarly, step (2) speciﬁes that Alice can send out her key at any
time she wants. If the variable k is true, it means that the correct key has been
sent out. Otherwise, it represents that Alice has not sent out any key or the key
that has been sent out is wrong. Moreover, step (3) and (4) models that Alice can
contact TTP for abort or recovery as long as she has received enough messages, but
she does not set the A contact T as true. The last two steps describe the situations
when Alice has received EORM or an abort token from TTP.
Listing 2: Extracted dishonest model of Alice for the extended CEM protocol
-- idle actin while not stopped
[] ~pa_stop & pa_eoo ->
-- Alice can stop at any time
[] ~pa_stop & pa_eoo -> pa_stop ’:= true
-- (1) Alice can send EOO at any time
--send correct hashed key
[] ~pa_stop & ~pa_eoo & ~hk & ~hke
-> pa_eoo ’:= true; hk ’:= true
--send incorrect hashed key
[] ~pa_stop & ~pa_eoo & ~hk & ~hke
-> pa_eoo ’:= true; hke ’:= true
-- (2) Alice can send out key at any time
[] ~pa_stop & ~k -> k’:= true
-- (3) Alice can send abort request
[] ~pa_stop & pa_eoo -> A_abort_req ’:= true
-- (4) Alice can send recovery request
[] ~pa_stop & pb_halfeorm -> A_reovery_req ’:= true
-- (5) Alice receives abort token
[] ~pa_stop & T_abort_send_A -> T_abort_token_A ’:= true
-- (6) Alice receives recovery token
[] ~pa_stop & T_recovery_send_A -> pa_rece_eorm ’:= true
In a similar way, we can model the dishonest behaviours of Bob.
List. 3 models the corresponding behaviours of TTP. TTP is a special player
that has to be modelled in a particular way. It must be objective, and cannot act
in collusion with protocol participants. We build the model for TTP that strictly
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follow the protocol. For each protocol round, we use a variable T stateAB to
record the status of protocol. T stateAB has three possible values, which are abrt,
recov and empty representing aborted, recovered and empty states, respectively.
After receiving recovery or abort request, TTP will behave according to the values
of T stateAB. The ﬁrst part describes how TTP deals with abort request from
initiator Alice. TTP sends out abort token to both Alice and Bob if the status is
empty or abrt, and the T stateAB is also needed to be set as abrt if the original
status is empty. However, if T stateAB is recov, which means the corresponding
round has already been recovered, then the corresponding EORM and key must be
sent to Alice and Bob respectively. Part two and three models the behaviours of
dealing with recovery requests from Alice and Bob. If the TTP receives a recovery
request and its status is empty or recov, then the required evidences or key must
be sent to Alice and Bob respectively. Otherwise, abort token will be sent out.
Listing 3: Extracted model of TTP for the extended CEM protocol
-- (1) If TTP receives abort request from Alice
[] A_abort_req & (T_stateAB=abrt) & ~T_response_A
-> T_abort_send_A ’:= true; T_abort_send_B ’:= true;
T_response_A ’:= true
[] A_abort_req & (T_stateAB=empty) & ~T_response_A
-> T_abort_send_A ’:= true; T_abort_send_B ’:= true;
T_response_A ’:= true; T_stateAB ’:= abrt
[] A_abort_req & (T_stateAB=recov) & ~T_response_A
-> T_recovery_send_A ’:= true; T_recovery_send_B ’:= true;
T_response_A ’:= true
-- (2) If TTP receives recovery request from Alice
[] A_recovery_req & (T_state=empty) & ~T_response_A ->
-> T_stateAB ’:= recov; T_recovery_send_A ’:= true;
T_recovery_send_B ’:= true; T_response_A ’:= true
[] A_recovery_req & (T_state=recov) & ~T_response_A ->
-> T_recovery_send_A ’:= true;T_recovery_send_B ’:= true;
T_response_A ’:= true
[] A_recovery_req & (T_state=abrt) & ~T_response_A ->
-> T_abort_send_A ’:= true;T_abort_send_B ’:= true;
T_response_A ’:= true
-- (3) If TTP receives recovery request from Bob
[] B_recovery_req & (T_state=empty) & ~T_response_B ->
-> T_stateAB ’:= recov; T_recovery_send_A ’:= true;
T_recovery_send_B ’:= true; T_response_B ’:= true
[] B_recovery_req & (T_state=recov) & ~T_response_B ->
-> T_recovery_send_A ’:= true;T_recovery_send_B ’:= true;
T_response_B ’:= true
[] B_recovery_req & (T_state=abrt) & ~T_response_B ->
-> T_abort_send_A :=true;T_abort_send_B ’:= true;
T_response_B ’:= true
4.2 Expressing properties of the protocol in ATL
Given a CEM protocol with just two participants Alice and Bob, the following
expressions are suitable for honest participant even if the other is dishonest. Ac-
tually, we only care about fairness and timeliness for honest participant. As to
eﬀectiveness, it requires that both participants must behave honestly.
Eﬀectiveness. If honest participants are willing to exchange emails for receipts,
then the protocol will terminate in a state that Alice has obtained EOR and Bob
has received EOO and M without the involvement of TTP.
eﬀectiveness ≡ (〈〈PaH,PbH〉〉 (EOO ∧M ∧ EOR))
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where PaH and PbH represent honest participants Alice and Bob, and EOR rep-
resents the evidence of receipt from receiver Bob. In addition, the EOO and M
represents the evidence of origin and the email content from Alice.
Timeliness. At any time, an honest participant has a strategy to stop the protocol
and thus to prevent endless waiting. Timeliness for Alice and Bob is formulated as:
timelinessPa ≡ ∀ (〈〈PaH〉〉Pa stop) timelinessPb ≡ ∀ (〈〈PbH〉〉Pb stop).
where PaH and PbH represent the honest Alice and Bob, and Pa stop (Pb stop)
represents that Alice (Bob) has already terminated the protocol.
Fairness. A protocol is fair for honest Alice Pa if the following is satisﬁed: whenever
Bob obtains Pa’s non-repudiation evidence of origin (EOO) and email content M ,
PaH has a strategy to obtain Bob’s non-repudiable evidence of receipt (EOR). In
ATL, fairness for honest Alice can be formulated as:
fairnessPaH ≡ ∀ ((EOO ∧M) ⇒ 〈〈PaH〉〉 (EOR)).
Similarly, fairness for Bob is formulated as below. If Alice obtains PbH’s EOR,
honest Bob PbH has a strategy to get Alice’s EOR and email content M .
fairnessPbH ≡ ∀ ((EOR) ⇒ 〈〈PbH〉〉 (EOO ∧M)).
4.3 Analysis
We have built three Mocha models, PaH ‖ PbH ‖ TTP , Pa ‖ PbH ‖ TTP , and
PaH ‖ Pb ‖ TTP , combining the aforementioned formulas, to verify fairness, time-
liness and eﬀectiveness of our CEM protocol. These properties were successfully
checked in Mocha.
5 Veriﬁcation of the Protocol in μCRL
In this section, we only give a sketch on how we model the protocol in μCRL, and
focus on how to check TTP transparency of the protocol in μCRL. The detailed
models and analysis can be found in [14].
5.1 Modeling the protocol in μCRL
As stated in Sect. 5, each μCRL speciﬁcation consists of two parts, which are
abstract data type deﬁnitions and behavioural speciﬁcations for participants. Since
the execution of protocol mainly depends on the exchange of messages, the contents
of the data are not treated in details, instead the data type used and corresponding
operations on it are captured. Therefore, we can simplify the complex cryptographic
primitives, such as encryption, decryption and veriﬁably encryption of messages.
TTP transparency states that the ﬁnal evidences do not reveal whether TTP
has intervened in the protocol or not. The main idea of checking TTP transparency
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is to compare traces obtained from three diﬀerent models after hiding all unneces-
sary actions, such as messages between TTP and the users, as well as minimising
the generated state space modulo weak trace equivalence. The three models are
combinations of honest Alice and honest Bob, honest Alice and malicious Bob and
TTP, and malicious Alice and honest Bob and TTP.
Participants are hooked up by communication channels. According to our as-
sumption, the communications channels are resilient, in the sense that every message
is guaranteed to reach its destination eventually. Therefore, by using the encapsu-
lation and communication operators in μCRL, we are able enforce the actions of
participants Alice, Bob and TTP to synchronise. Each participant is deﬁned as a
process. The communications between them are composed by actions of sending
and receiving messages. The honest and dishonest behaviours of the participants
resemble those in the Mocha models.
For instance, the behaviours of the initiator Alice are modelled in a process
with a parameter key, which initiates the CEM protocol by sending evidence of
origin EOO to receiver Bob. The action init Alice(x,y,i,A,B) shows that Alice ini-
tiates a protocol round i for delivering an email y to Bob using a key x. Then
after receiving the veriﬁably encrypted message from Bob, honest Alice will send
out her key. If Bob’s ﬁnal reply EOR is correct, Alice will be sure that she has com-
pleted one email delivery and successfully obtained the evidence of receipt. Action
evidence Alice(x,y,i,halfeorm,eorm,A,B) reports that she has already obtained the ev-
idence for protocol round i which sends email y with key x. The sketch of Alice’s
behaviour is described as follows.
Alice(x : Key) =
∑
y:Item
∑
i:Number initSend(A, eoo,B).init A(A, y, x, i,B)
recv(B, halfeorm,A).send(A, k,B).
recv(B, eorm,A).evidence A(A, y, x, i, eorm,B)
where eoo represents the the ﬁrst message 1ex for protocol round i. The halfeorm
and eorm represents Bob’s veriﬁably encrypted signature and ﬁnal signature. We
need to extend the above process when taking TTP into account to cover when Alice
can contact TTP and receive replies from TTP. Similarly, honest Bod, dishonest
Alice, dishonest Bob, and TTP can be modelled in μCRL as well, by specifying
their behaviours as discussed before.
5.2 Analysis
Our way to check TTP transparency is by comparing traces of getting evidences
between system of only honest participants and systems containing dishonest par-
ticipants. After hiding some actions and reducing the model, we obtain a trace from
the honest system that is depicted in Fig. 1(a), which shows the situation of getting
evidences without TTP. Fig. 1(b) describes traces obtained from the model contain-
ing honest Alice, dishonest Bob, and TTP. We can ﬁnd that Fig. 1(b) has one more
trace. Evidences for both traces are of the same form, but the sequence of getting
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Fig. 1. The obtained traces.
them are diﬀerent. However, this diﬀerence does not aﬀect the correctness of TTP
transparency. When checking the evidences possessed Bob and Alice, the only thing
that matters is the content of the evidences, and the number of transitions (which
might reﬂect the execution time) is irrelevant due to the asynchrony of the protocol
model. Fig. 1(c) depicts the traces obtained from the model containing dishonest
Alice, honest Bob and TTP. We can ﬁnd that this ﬁgure has one more trace than
Fig. 1(b). This extra trace describes Alice’s malicious behaviours of using the key
(k2) that does not match the protocol round (i1). However, the occurrence of this
trace manifests that both Alice and Bob get their expected evidences without the
intervene of TTP. As if Alice or Bob tries to contact TTP for recovery, they will
just obtain error message instead of evidences. Therefore, this trace does not reveal
the involvement of TTP. By the above analysis, we can draw a conclusion that our
extended CEM protocol satisﬁes TTP transparency.
6 Related Work
It has been acknowledged that formal veriﬁcation is important for security protocols,
because of the seriousness of security ﬂaws. In this paper, we use the technology
of model checking to check automatically whether a given model of CEM protocols
satisfy some given speciﬁcations. To our knowledge, the literature of formal veri-
ﬁcations of CEM protocols includes the works of Kremer et al. [13], Cederquist et
al. [8] and Abadi and Blanchet [1].
Kremer et al. [13] propose an approach for modeling and analysis of CEM pro-
tocols using model checker Mocha. The advantage of using Mocha is that it allows
to model CEM protocols with concurrent game structures, and specify properties
in ATL, a temporal logic with game semantics. Therefore, Mocha is well suited
for checking properties such as fairness, timeliness and eﬀectiveness that can be
naturally interpreted with game semantics. For similar reasons, Mocha has been
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used for other fair exchange protocols [10,23]. Besides Mocha, the μCRL toolset,
together with CADP which acts as an back-end, has also used to analyse CEM
protocols automatically. Cederquist et al. [8] design an optimistic CEM protocol
and check both safety and liveness properties using μCRL toolset. The desired
properties are speciﬁed using μ-calculus. There exists another way to check CEM
protocols, which is proposed by Abadi and Blanchet [1]. Their protocol is speciﬁed
using the applied pi calculus. Taking the protocol speciﬁcation as input language,
the veriﬁer ProVerif automatically checks the property secrecy. As to fairness, it is
not checked fully automatically, but with some manual proofs.
7 Conclusion
We have formally veriﬁed the protocol [15], an extension of the key chain based
CEM protocol [9] by Cederquist et al. to cover an additional requirement TTP
transparency. The veriﬁcation was taken in two steps. First, we checked fairness,
eﬀectiveness and timeliness properties, using the model checker Mocha. Then we
have modelled the protocol in a process algebraic language μCRL and used its
toolsets together with CADP to check TTP transparency. Our analysis showed
that the protocol achieves the design goals.
The way to formalize TTP transparency in this paper abstracts a lot from the
underlying cryptographic techniques and the ability of the adversary. In the future,
we would like to investigate a more appropriate approach, for example, it is inter-
esting to see whether we can interpret TTP transparency using static equivalence in
the applied pi calculus [2]. Another direction is to extend the protocol furthermore,
to cover other design goals such as stateless TTP and accountability.
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